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Abstract
Agents in a peer-to-peer system typically have incentives to inﬂuence its network structure, either
to reduce their costs or to increase their ability to capture value. The problem is compounded when
agents can join and leave the system dynamically. This paper explores the use of mechanism design
techniques to offset the incentives for strategic behavior and facilitate the formation of networks with
desirable global properties.
1 Introduction
Consider the numerous efforts underway to create community wireless networks in urban areas. Today,
many are simply lists of “hot spots” operated by individuals and businesses. Others have more ambitious
goals in the spirit of the Rooftops project at MIT:
The overall system should be ﬁnancially and technologically self-sufﬁcient. It should allow
people to join the Internet generally without recourse to wireline carriers, and without substan-
tial work beyond the purchase and installation of the node.1
These goals imply networks in which most packets receive transit across one or more wireless nodes to
reach the Internet, with the cost of the relatively few wireline connections either donated or shared among
the users.
Despite the enormous value such networks have the potential to create, they present classic incentive
problems that may inhibit their growth. At one extreme, if costs cannot be shared at all, nodes at the edges
of the network will be free riders, beneﬁting disproportionately from others’ connectivity and willingness
to provide transit. But if nodes can charge arbitrary prices, those with wireline connections or at network
“bottlenecks” will be able to extract rents from their less favorably connected neighbors, which may in turn
lead to investment in technically unnecessary links to mitigate the hold-up problem. An ideal mechanism
would balance these opposing forces, not only for a ﬁxed network structure but also given agents’ choices
about how and when to connect to the system.
Network formation has been studied by a growing body of research in economics and game theory, e.g.,
papers by Jackson and Wolinsky [5] and Dutta and Mutuswami [1]. This literature focuses on situations in
which agents choose which links to form, thereby creating a network whose value—and each agent’s ability
to capture it—depends on its structure. A common theme of this work is the tension between stability and
￿
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1“Rooftops,” http://rooftops.media.mit.edu, accessed March 24, 2003.efﬁciency: high-value networks may be vulnerable to agents’ incentives to modify their structure, while
networks in which all agents are doing as well as they can for themselves may not maximize social welfare.
The network formation literature generally assumes an environment of perfect information, and agents are
often assumed to interact through decentralized bargaining.
A related body of research has considered networks from a mechanism design perspective. The ﬁeld
of mechanism design explores conditions under which system designers can achieve various economic and
computational properties in the presence of strategic agents (see Parkes [8] for a survey). Many of these
resultscanbeapplieddirectlytosystemsthatinvolvenetworks, forexample, mechanismsthatallocate
costs in a multicast tree [2], and mechanisms that address an optimal routing problem [3]. This work
typically assumes that the set of nodes in the system is ﬁxed, a simpliﬁcation that contrasts with the more
dynamic approach of the network formation literature. On the other hand, agents delegate the choice of
network structure to a central mechanism and it becomes critical to ensure that their incentives support
truthful revelation of preference information. This focus on private information poses signiﬁcant additional
challenges.
One notable exception to the focus on static systems within mechanism design is the recent work of
Friedman and Parkes [4], which introduces the problem of online mechanism design for dynamic systems
with agents that arrive and leave over time. The model that we introduce in this paper can be viewed as a
relaxation of this earlier work, as we describe below.
We believe that bringing these streams of research together may shed light on issues of particular rele-
vance to the peer-to-peer systems community, as suggested by the wireless networking scenario above and
elaborated in the remainder of the paper.
2 Problem Deﬁnition
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all possible networks.2 The mechanism design approach uses payments to implement networks with good
properties, even though the types are private information. As is standard, we assume agents have quasilinear
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The cornerstone of traditional mechanism design is the class of direct mechanisms, in which each agent
announces a type,
O
￿
￿ , then the mechanism responds with an outcome. The mechanism is assumed to be
capable of enforcing the outcome, perhaps through some prior contract with the agents. For this reason,
mechanisms that violate individual rationality, i.e., that may make an agent worse off by participating, are
viewed with suspicion.3 In a strategyproof direct mechanism, it is a dominant strategy for each agent to
report its true type. In other words, whatever any other agent reports and whatever the types of other agents,
an agent can be truthful. This provides useful robustness to a system, and simplicity for participants.
If we hold the set of agents ﬁxed, we can apply the standard repertoire of direct mechanisms, including
the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, to the network formation problem. The VCG
mechanism is both strategyproof and efﬁcient, meaning in this context that it always chooses a network that
maximizes the total value of the system to the agents. Unfortunately, although it is individually rational and
2It is convenient to assume a ﬁnite set of agents. This can be easily relaxed, by restating an agent’s valuation in terms of the
structure of the network, with either indifference to agent identity or the ability to capture classes of agent identities.
3In the context of a peer-to-peer system, this may nevertheless require some method to verify that peers are choosing to perform
as instructed.
2revenue maximizing among efﬁcient mechanisms [6], the VCG mechanism is not budget balanced; money
may need to be pumped into it to retain strategyproofness. This tradeoff is pervasive in mechanism design.
Alternative approaches, e.g., Moulin and Shenker [7], take strategyproofness and budget balance as central
criteria, and seek mechanisms that minimize inefﬁciency.
If we allow agents to join and leave the system dynamically, we must look beyond classical direct
mechanisms, and towards online mechanisms [4]. We need a mechanism that takes a sequence of decisions,
possibly one each time the state of the system changes. This is akin to the online algorithm problem, where
choices must be made on-the-ﬂy without the beneﬁt of information about the agents yet to arrive.
Moreover, in our context these online decisions must be mutually consistent to achieve useful incentive
properties. This is clear enough in a resource allocation context: the mechanism cannot give to one agent a
resource it promised another in a previous period. The notion of consistency is trickier in a network forma-
tion context. First, the mechanism can only form networks that are feasible with the agents that are present
in the system at a given time; if an agent leaves, the existing network becomes infeasible by deﬁnition. This
may be a mere technicality, if the departure does not affect the network’s value to the remaining agents—
or it could be a catastrophe. (Consider the wireless networking scenario again, and imagine there is only
one agent with a wireline Internet connection!) Second, even if all agents remain in the system after they
arrive, adding a new agent may impose externalities on the others, such as additional network congestion.
These externalities may render the current network no longer value maximizing, necessitating a change in
network structure to maintain efﬁciency. The payments required to maintain incentive compatibility might
also change.
The online mechanism design situation is complicated by the possibility that agents may want to strate-
gically manipulate their arrival or departure times. In the context of VCG-based mechanisms, an online
mechanism can achieve strategyproofness in this broader sense if the online choice rule is perfectly com-
petitive with an optimal ofﬂine choice with complete information about all future arrivals [4]. When this is
possible, one can simply update the state of the network every time an agent arrives or leaves, with payments
computed to reward each agent with the marginal utility it contributes to the system. But this solution might
be computationally and informationally infeasible—not to mention ﬁnancially expensive.4 In this paper, we
will sidestep the issue by assuming agents’ arrival and departure times are exogenous to the mechanism and
truthfully reported (or observed) and focus on the mutual consistency issue identiﬁed above. Even under
these more restrictive assumptions, the problem remains challenging.
3 The Online Mechanism
Consider agents that arrive sequentially, letting
P
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In a setting in which the designer’s goal is to maximize the total value of the system, the function
l
￿
￿ can be
selected to be an estimate of the value of the system for future agents, taking into account the commitments
implied by the mechanism’s choice at time
P
:
￿ .
4In the context of strategic arrivals, we can instead consider mechanisms with expected optimal online choice rules, which
provides Bayesian Nash incentive compatibility instead of strategyproofness [4].
3In order to guarantee the strategyproofness of the mechanism, such that agents choose to announce
types truthfully, we require that the value of the network to an agent stay constant as long as it remains in
the network.5 The function
y
v
￿ expresses these consistency constraints:
y
^
￿
~
￿
￿
￿
g
5
D
￿
E
￿
’
n
z
K
{
f
s
}
$
￿
#
d
V
p
3
6
5
&
￿
O
￿
o
V
￿
<
Y
￿
!
#
￿
V
￿
3
6
5
￿
V
￿
O
￿
o
V
￿
< for all
S
￿
R
￿
Q
:
￿
k
S
￿
￿
￿
￿
m
3
s
P
4
￿
W
<
;
￿ .
With this, thepayment byagent
Q iscomputed attime
P
￿
￿ withamethod similar to theGroves mechanisms,
with
l
T
￿ taking the place of the usual linear summation term:
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For the sequential mechanism deﬁned by choice rule (1) and payment rule (2) to be strategyproof, it is
sufﬁcient that the consistency constraints can be satisﬁed. With this, and by a standard Groves argument,
the utility to agent
Q for an announced type
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By inspection, since
Q can only inﬂuence its utility through the effect of its announced type on
5
￿
￿ , the
agent should announce its true type to make the choice rule (1) explicitly maximize the ﬁrst two terms of
(3).
In comparison with standard Groves mechanisms, it is interesting that the choice rule in (1) is more
relaxed because
l
￿
￿ need not be the total value to all other agents. But, we retain a greedy form of this
utilitarian requirement in Groves via the consistency constraints, which capture the intuition that future
decisions must be optimal for the new agent subject to the requirement that they in no way hurt any previous
agents still in the system.
Compared with Friedman and Parkes [4], we have relaxed the assumption of strategic arrivals, and
moved away from implementing VCG payments. We ﬁnd this interesting, because we can achieve strat-
egyproofness with respect to announced types without placing stringent requirements, such as perfect-
competitiveness with an ofﬂine decision, on the online choice rule of the mechanism. Instead, of central
importance in our mechanism is that the consistency requirements are satisﬁed by sequential choices.
4 Ongoing Work
In closing, we discuss what can go wrong when consistency requirements cannot be satisﬁed, and then
propose some approaches to address this issue.
First, what if the consistency constraints cannot be satisﬁed? For one thing, individual rationality may
be violated. As suggested by the example of a wireless network in which only one agent has a wireline
connection, if there are agents whose presence is essential for the system to have value, and those agents
leave—or never arrive—then agents that have made positive payments may be left with negative utility
overall. One way to avoid this, of course, would be to ensure that such agents do arrive and prevent them
from leaving. If this is impractical, it may still be possible to guarantee interim individual rationality (i.e.,
positive expected utility for every agent type) if we have information about the distribution of arrivals and
departures. But strategyproofness may be violated even if individual rationality is not, simply by breaking
the requirement that
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Q ’s time in the system.
Several directions seem particularly promising for further exploration, to address the consistency issue
but retain incentive properties:
5This can be relaxed if the departure time of an agent is known, with an agent instead receiving a guaranteed total value over its
time in the system.
4restrictions  Placerestrictionsonthesetoffeasiblenetworkstoensuresequentialconsistency.
oblivious scaling Dynamically scale back the values of agents dynamically, when faced with consistency
problems, with a method that is oblivious to the announced type of an agent.
friendlyagentsInjectanumberoffriendlyagentsintoasystem,thatcanstep inandensurethefeasibility
of consistency requirements when necessary.
In addition, there may be restrictions on agent types that lead out positive results. Finally, if the class of
strategyproof mechanisms proves too restrictive, we will naturally explore weaker implementation concepts.
To further understand the implications of the consistency requirements, we need to investigate the kinds
of constraints that arise for various classes of value functions. Simple value functions (e.g.,
￿ if connected, 0
otherwise) should yield simpler constraints than complex ones, but they are also less expressive. We would
like to discover more complex value functions that nonetheless yield simple and easily satisﬁed constraints.
We also recognize that the computational issues are no less important than the economic ones—an ideal
mechanism would be distributed, requiring only local information (e.g. [9])—and that theory will only get
us so far: the inevitable design tradeoffs will need to be assessed in experiments and working systems.
5 Conclusions
Thereisafascinatingandimportantresearchprogramindevelopingeconomically motivatedcomputational
methods to facilitate the formation of networks with desirable properties in peer-to-peer systems. We have
provided a formal model in which to study mechanism design in a dynamic setting with agents that can
arrive and leave dynamically. We identiﬁed the requirement that online decisions are mutually consistent.
This is of paramount importance in extending traditional techniques from mechanism design to the context
of ad hoc network formation.
References
[1] Dutta, Bhaskar, and Suresh Mutuswami (1997). “Stable Networks.” Journal of Economic Theory 76, 322–344.
[2] Feigenbaum, Joan, Christos Papadimitriou, and Scott Shenker (2001). “Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmis-
sions.” In Journal of Computer and System Sciences 63, 21–41.
[3] Feigenbaum, Joan, Christos Papadimitriou, Rahul Sami, and Scott Shenker (2002). “A BGP-based Mechanism for
Lowest-Cost Routing.” In Proc. 21st Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, ACM Press, 173–182.
[4] Friedman, Eric J., and David C. Parkes (2003). “Pricing WiFi at Starbucks – Issues in Online Mechanism Design.”
Posterpaper,to appear inProc.4thACMConf.onElectronicCommerce(EC’03).
[5]Jackson, MatthewO., andAsherWolinsky (1996). “A StrategicModelof Social andEconomicNetworks.”Journal
of Economic Theory 71, 44–74.
[6] Krishna, Vijay, and Motty Perry (2000). “Efﬁcient Mechanism Design.” Working paper.
[7] Moulin, Herv´ e, and Scott Shenker (2001). “Strategyproof Sharing of Submodular Costs: Budget Balance versus
Efﬁciency.” Economic Theory 18, 511–533.
[8] Parkes, David C. (2001). Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Computational Efﬁciency,
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, Chapter 2.
[9]Shneidman,Jeffrey,andDavidC.Parkes(2003).“Rationalityandself-interestinpeertopeernetworks.”
To appear inProc.2ndInt.WorkshoponPeer-to-PeerSystems(IPTPS’03).
5